The Time that Binds the ‘Trade-Development’ Nexus in International Economic Law by Alessandrini, Donatella
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Alessandrini, Donatella  (2020) The Time that Binds the ‘Trade-Development’ Nexus in International
Economic Law.   Trade, Law and Development .    ISSN 0976-2329.    (In press)
DOI













This article takes issue with the conventional story about ‘trade and development’ according to which their 
nexus emerged in the immediate post-war period when the international community came to realise the 
wisdom of trade liberalisation and translated it into law. It argues that the trade-development nexus has 
a much older history, one in which continuities and (dis)continuities with the colonial period need to be 
taken into account to appreciate how, despite the seven decades long efforts of the international trade 
community, ‘development’ remains to be achieved and its promise continues to hold such normative force. 
This force reverberates within current development-related trade prescriptions, such as those that encourage 
developing countries to insert their firms into Global Value Chains and technologically ‘upgrade’ in order 
to develop. The article shows that once the continuities and (dis)continuities with the colonial period are 
made apparent, multilateral trade law can be seen as elevating a particular understanding of economic life 
(i.e. trade for growth) to a universal standing whilst at the same time enabling selective commercial 
interests to be pursued, thereby contradicting the free trade assumption about universal beneficial gains. 
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This article traces the links that were established in the immediate post-war period 
between trade and development thinking on the one hand and multilateral trade law and 
policy on the other. Trade textbooks acknowledge that international trade has a long 
history; most, however, start with the birth of ‘free trade’ thinking in Europe, and in 
particular, with the theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo which first impacted 
European state practices in the 19th century, but which are seen to have emerged as the 
dominant trade wisdom at the end of World War II. It is also in the historic context of 
the post-war period that ‘development’ is supposed to have emerged as an issue to be 
dealt with by the newly formed multilateral trade community: as ‘development’ was 
identified with growth, trade liberalisation became one of its most important vehicles, 
particularly for those countries which came to be regarded as ‘less developed’ or 
‘developing’.  
 
Developing countries’ participation in the international trading system is thus supposed 
to have started with them entering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
in 1947. Their accession is presented as the moment in time when the trade and 
development link was forged, and the multilateral trading system started reflecting on the 
applicability of its economic assumptions to developing countries.1 ‘Trade and 
Development’ or ‘Trade and Developing Countries’ is invariably one of the last chapters 
in these textbooks, an add-on issue to an otherwise universally valid multilateral trade law 
and rationale which finds its beginning in the post-war period.2 ‘Trade and Development’ 
also forms part of both the first and second moments of the Law and Development 
(LAD) discipline as described by Trubek and Santos: international trade is managed by 
the state in the first moment, directed by market forces in the second and now governed 
by a mix between the two to achieve competitiveness in the global market.3 Common to 
both narratives is the acknowledgement that ‘development’ remains to be achieved and it 
is important to re-orient our trade tools in order to do so.   
 
This article tells a different story: it argues that the trade-development link has a much 
older history than textbooks account for, one in which continuities and discontinuities 
with the colonial period need to be taken into account to appreciate how, despite the 
seven decades long efforts of the international trade community, ‘development’ remains 
to be achieved and its promise continues to hold such normative force. Drawing on the 
insights of decolonial, post-development, and Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL), this article argues that another way to approach ‘development’ is to see it 
as an apparatus that has enabled forms of knowledge about ‘Third World’ societies to be 
 
1 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 605 (4th ed. 
2012) [hereinafter Trebilcock et al]; MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION: 
LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 763 (2nd ed. 2006) [hereinafter Matsushita]; BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & 
MICHAEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 532 (2nd ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter Hoekman & Kostecki]; BRIAN MCDONALD, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 47 (1998) 
[hereinafter Brian].  
2 Virtually all trade textbooks present this history and have a chapter dedicated to developing countries, 
only after presenting the general rules of trade, the history of the GATT, and the specific WTO 
agreements. For instance, Trebilcock et al, supra note 1; Matsushita, supra note 1; Hoekman & Kostecki, supra 
note 1; Brian, supra note 1.  
3 See DAVID TRUBEK, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1-18 
(David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter Trubek & Santos].  
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linked with forms of power and intervention, resulting in the transformation of such 
societies in the name of a supposedly superior and universal economic rationality. I have 
argued elsewhere that the development-related trade activity that emerged at the end of 
the colonial era has functioned on the basis of a universal economic rationality which 
relies on an unquestionable dichotomy between ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’  societies. The 
reliance on supposedly neutral economic theories then becomes the terrain that bridges 
this gap, together with the help and expertise of the most advanced members of the 
international community.4 Trade theory, law, and regulation have provided one such 
means and site of intervention, although it has not been a case of straightforward 
translation of economic rationality into law and state practice. 
 
The story told in this article is therefore not one of a master plan that was devised and 
smoothly realised with the transition from the colonial to the post-colonial period, but 
one of confluence of different historic, political, social, economic, and legal factors. 
Whilst aiming to highlight as many factors as possible, aware of the fact that this account 
can only be partial, I explicitly focus on one of them, which is, the modality through 
which a particular economic rationality was elevated to universal standings. This modality 
can be seen at play in two distinct moments of ‘trade and development’ post-war history, 
those which resulted in the creation of the GATT and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). As development was made to coincide with economic growth, and those 
countries which lacked growth were considered, which to an extent identified themselves 
as economically ‘backward’, a particular (temporal) understanding of ‘development’ 
emerged and crystallised into multilateral trade law and practice. According to this 
understanding, those countries which ‘failed to develop’ their trade as fast as 
industrialised nations, would have to adopt certain policies in order to ‘catch up’.5 
Infused with this linear and progressive understanding of trade history (i.e. societies 
follow the same path and are destined to the same universal end), the terms of the trade-
development nexus were set: multilateral trade rules could be reformed to better enable 
trade to deliver development so that, more or less trade liberalisation could be debated - 
but the ‘trade for growth’ premise was hardly ever called into question.6 
 
What is at stake in the story thus told? The point is not to present it as the alternative 
story, but as a different lens for looking at the relationship between trade and 
development. Mignolo and Walsh have argued that, the point from which one starts the 
 
4 DONATELLA ALESSANDRINI, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM: THE 
FAILURE AND PROMISE OF THE WTO DEVELOPMENT MISSION 4-10 (2010) [hereinafter Alessandrini].  
5 As will be seen below, this ‘failure’ structured the mandate of the first committee of experts tasked by the 
GATT parties to investigate the problems that developing countries faced while trading in the world 
market, which resulted in the Haberler Report of 1957 that was to set the parameters of GATT 
development-related trade activity of the subsequent decades, see, note 59. The broader imperative to ‘catch 
up’ however can be seen underpinning the set of theoretical and policy interventions that came to be 
grouped under the banner of ‘development economics’, in particular Rostow’s linear stages of growth and 
Lewis’ dual economy models, which were also published in the 1950s and emphasised, in different ways, 
the need for structural changes that would lead to rapid capital accumulation. For reference, see WALT W. 
ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 4-16 (3rd ed. 1990) [hereinafter 
Rostow]; W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor, 22 (2) Manchester Sch. 139-
91 (1954).  
6 Fakhri, for instance, argues that this conceptualisation of trade is a recent development as trade used to 
be about procuring means of subsistence or luxury before the emergence of capitalism. It is with the shift 
to capitalism, where societies no longer produce in order to reproduce themselves but in order to 
accumulate capital that trade becomes instrumental to economic growth and capital accumulation. See 
MICHAEL FAKHRI, SUGAR AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 4 (2014) [hereinafter 
Fakhri]. 
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story (in this case the one about trade and development) has important implications on 
the conclusions that one reaches about that story.7 So if we start, as trade lawyers 
normally do, from the post-war period and the political-economic decision of the 
international community to translate free trade theory into multilateral trade law, we will 
arrive at certain conclusions, which are different from the ones we may arrive at, if we 
start with colonialism and the ‘civilizing mission’ that accompanied the pursuit of 
particular trade interests. The different lens presented in this article matters because it 
shows the constraining effects that the positing and elevation of a particular economic 
rationality as a universal truth (i.e. growth as the maximisation of material wealth through 
competitive advantage and accumulation) has on the possibility of experimenting with 
different socio-economic systems, including those which may not have growth, 
competition and accumulation as their ultimate objectives. Although, the third LAD 
moment seems to inaugurate a ‘time’ which is marked by the recognition that 
development “lies as a battlefield” where all dogmas about state and market have been 
defeated,8 and despite the resulting emphasis on experimentation with different 
development models we can see with the Law and New Developmental State (LANDS) 
approaches; the “need to prosper in conditions of global competitiveness” remains 
firmly in place today.9 Global competitiveness, orders countries along a teleological 
spectrum that prescribes certain courses of action over others and this continues to be 
the case although challenges to the primacy of growth have entered the mainstream 
debate.10 
 
The complex interaction between trade, colonialism and development that this article 
highlights, continues to unfold, and in ways which are different in different parts of the 
world. However, the point that I wish to make, which is important for theoretical and 
practical reasons, is that, the trade-development nexus has both: a history which is longer 
than what is often presented; and a temporal quality that limits the possibility of 
experimenting with different socio-economic models, which might be more desirable 
than the current ones. To make this point, the first part focuses on the ‘translation’ 
aspect of the trade-development story, which is found in trade textbooks: I excavate the 
free trade principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, which are said to inform 
the legal apparatus of multilateral trade and to deliver gains for all - including 
‘development’ for countries which lack it – to show that they cannot account for the 
selective liberalisation practice that has characterised post-war trade relations. This 
meticulous, and at times prosaic account of the inconsistencies between theory, law and 
practice is necessary, given the prominence that textbooks accord to the story about an 
international community which realizes the universal validity and desirability of these 
principles and strives to translate them into law. Once the continuities with colonialism 
are made apparent, these principles can instead be seen as elevating a particular 
understanding of economic life (i.e. trade for growth) to universal standings whilst at the 
same time enabling selective trade interests to be pursued, thereby contradicting the free 
trade assumption about universal beneficial gains. I then show that, this dynamic 
unfolded due to the positioning of an undisputed ‘lack’, ‘inadequacy’ or ‘failure’ on part 
 
7 WALTER MIGNOLO & CATHERINE WALSH, ON DECOLONIALITY: CONCEPTS, ANALYTICS, PRAXIS 237 
(2018).  
8 David Trubek, Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of Development and Law 
1-16 (U. Wis. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 1075, 2008). 
9 David Trubek, Law, State and the “New Developmentalism”: An Introduction, in LAW, STATE AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA CASE STUDIES 19 (Trubek et al. eds., 2013).  
10 With respect to current global well-being and happiness agendas, see Donatella Alessandrini et al., 
Exploring Well-Being and Gross National Happiness in Sustainable Development Policy Making, 7 INDIAN J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 52, 88 (2015).  
 5 
of developing countries’ regimes on whom, overcoming ‘development’ was believed to 
rely. Subsequently, in the second part, I argue that the acceptance of these terms, severely 
limited the possibility of affecting change within the GATT. A similar dynamic could be 
seen to be unfolding with the establishment of the WTO when developing countries’ 
‘failure’ was re-conceptualised and the reach of free trade principles was extended to new 
areas in order to overcome the failure, while selective trade liberalisation continued to 
characterise multilateral trade practice. I conclude by reflecting on the reverberations of 
this modality within the current development-related trade prescriptions, particularly 
those that focus on Global Value Chains (GVCs). 
 
II. THE LINK BETWEEN TRADE THEORY AND LAW: AN UNEASY TRANSLATION 
 
The WTO is what comes to mind when we think of multilateral trade, even though, the 
multilateral level is only one site of legal intervention concerning trade.11 Unlike its 
predecessor, the GATT, WTO’s sphere of competence goes well beyond trade in goods 
to encompass trade in services, trade-related investment measures, and intellectual 
property (IP) rights, and its laws have an acknowledged environmental, labour and 
human rights dimension. It is, therefore, considered to be one of the cornerstones of the 
current international economic order. As a legal regime, the WTO is thought to embody 
a liberal economic philosophy, in particular, the belief that trade liberalisation, that is the 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, is conducive to employment, growth and 
ultimately ‘development’.12 
 
The economic principle informing this edifice is that of comparative advantage, a 
concept which most trade textbooks refer to when explaining the benefits of trade 
liberalization, which the WTO is supposed to facilitate. Formulated in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, and revised since, this theory is believed to have provided the most cogent 
explanation as to why it makes sense for states to trade with one another.13 The 
conventional story is that when this ‘common sense’ was received in the post-war period, 
it got translated into the law of the GATT, albeit with several exceptions.14 As the story 
goes on to argue, the consolidation of this ‘common sense’ occurred fifty years later with 
the establishment of the WTO in 1995 and the extension of its free trade rationale to 
new areas, thereby perfecting the regime inaugurated by the GATT.  
 
 
11 Fakhri (supra note 6) critiques the focus on multilateral trade fora, such as the GATT and the WTO, 
arguing that placing our emphasis on such institutions obfuscates the myriad of other important micro 
sites in which international trade is conducted and constituted. Whilst an intervention such as Fakhri’s, 
reminds us of the crucial significance of these often-forgotten fora, the WTO remains one important site: 
its sphere of competence is extensive as the law of its seventeen agreements is binding on 164 member 
states and its reach is effective as the organisation is endowed with a dispute settlement mechanism, which 
has been defined as a world economic court in all but name. For reference, see Joseph H. Weiler, The Rule of 
Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute 
Settlement (Harv. L. Sch., Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9/00, 2000). 
12 Indeed, the Preamble recognizes that trade relations ‘should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and 
exchange of goods.’ See General Agreement on Trade in Services, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
(1994) 
13 See Trebilcock et al., supra note 1, at 2-6.  
14 The author uses the phrase ‘common sense’ as a way to see and approach the world, in this case, the 
world of ‘trade and development’. 
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The story told in this part is different, because it shows that the translation of free trade 
theory into law was not as straightforward in either moment. The emergence and 
consolidation of this rationality or ‘common sense’ entailed much more than ‘rationally’ 
accepting the intellectual wisdom and superiority of the free trade theory, since other 
historic, social, and economic factors also played an important role, including the 
imminent end of formal colonial rule in many parts of the world. Furthermore, 
multilateral trade law did much more than just receiving and embodying this ‘common 
sense’: it contributed towards making it.15  Multilateral trade rules were important factors 
that shaped this emergent economic rationality: as we shall see, principles of non-
discrimination and equal treatment in trade relations presented themselves as 
commonsensical and a universally valid set of rules which represented and furthered 
particular trade interests.  
 
The point that this part makes is that, looking at the free trade theory and multilateral 
trade law alone provides a very limited understanding of the trade-development nexus 
forged in the post-war period. We also need to explore the continuities and 
discontinuities of the colonial enterprise that was formally about to come to an end, in 
order to understand how it became possible for particular forms of knowledge to be 
elevated to universal truths, thereby providing the terms within which the trade-
development nexus could be articulated.  
 
A. The ‘Common Sense’ of Free Trade Theory: International Specialisation and Comparative 
Advantage 
 
The free trade theory combines two theoretical innovations introduced by Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo in the 18th and 19th centuries respectively. Succinctly, and quite 
reductively, Smith introduced the concept of international specialisation and Ricardo, 
that of comparative advantage.16 With these two tenets, the free trade theory has been 
ascribed the status of the most efficient global trade policy as it leads to the best 
allocation of worldwide resources and the greatest generation of material wealth in terms 
of goods and services that are produced.17 Consumer sovereignty and freedom of choice 
are identified as corollaries of this theory, and the main indicator of its success remains 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).18  
 
This theory, purporting to be universally valid and applicable, is supposed to have 
informed state practices during the golden age of economic liberalism.19 However, as 
 
15 Alessandrini, supra note 4 at 7-9. 
16 Reacting to the mercantilist theory which encouraged states to promote exports and limit imports so as 
to have a positive balance of payments, Smith argued that it made sense for states to import what they 
could not produce efficiently at home whilst specialising on those goods that they were more efficient in 
producing. By exporting the latter, states would acquire the currency needed to pay for imports. Ricardo 
refined the theory by arguing that what mattered in identifying the line of production to specialise on was 
not an ‘absolute’ but a ‘comparative’ advantage: not what a state can produce more efficiently vis-à-vis 
another state but what it can produce more efficiently at home along with its production frontiers 
considering its resources are limited. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 30-32 (1776); DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION 338 (1817).  
17 Id. 
18 Donatella Alessandrini, Transnational Corporations and the Doctrine of Comparative Advantage: A Critique of Free 
Trade Normative Assumptions 11 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. J. 14, 23 (2005) [hereinafter Alessandrini 
Transnational]. 
19 Trebilcock et al., supra note 1 at 20-24.  
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scholars have pointed out20, the significance of this period should not be exaggerated 
since liberal trade relations among European powers lasted only two decades (1850-1870) 
and bilateral treaties on selected goods rather than extensive liberalisation were the norm 
(mainly by Britain, France and Germany). Moreover, the application of this theory was 
never universal: the repeal of the Corn Laws – often cited as an example of unilateral free 
trade - took place at a moment when Britain had achieved manufacturing capacity and 
could focus on ‘value-added’ production, while importing cheaper grains from abroad.21 
As Chang has argued, Adam Smith himself encouraged the former American colonies to 
specialize in agriculture and disregard manufacturing while supplying Britain with 
‘efficient’ (i.e. cheap) agricultural goods; and Hamilton’s disregard for Smith’s 
recommendation paved the way for industrialisation in the United States (US).22 
 
Also, as soon as the economic crisis hit Germany, Bismarck retreated from bilateral free 
trade treaties and increased tariffs, followed by France and Britain.23 Countries in other 
words, abandoned their (selective) liberalisation by raising tariffs, bringing them back to 
their pre-liberalisation levels. Furthermore, the US Smoot-Hawley Act – often portrayed 
as having worsened states’ relations and precipitated the conditions which led to World 
War II - increased duties on imported goods. However, it is important to note that tariffs 
were already quite high, even before being increased by the Act.24 The point is that, the 
impact of free trade theory on states’ practice was much more modest than what it is 
often presented as, and its wisdom did not straightforwardly translate into liberalising 
laws and policies for the countries which are said to have adopted it. Rather, it was 
instrumentally and selectively employed to further national trade interests.  
 
A more coordinated multilateral activity took place in the early 1940s when states 
attempted to design the rules of the post-war international order. It is at this point, that 
the theory was finally accepted by the international community and translated into legally 
binding rules (the GATT’s). The neo-classical reformulation of the free trade doctrine, 
also known as the ‘factor endowment’ model, is shown to have provided the theoretical 
underpinnings of such rules. In 1933, Swedish economists Heckscher and Ohlin 
emphasised that what encompasses international trade is not just the productivity of 
labour, which is the only factor of production considered by the classical free trade 
theory; rather, trade arises because of the differences in the supply of factors of 
production (the higher the supply, the cheaper the price).25 Countries’ comparative 
advantage therefore, lies in those goods which intensely utilise factors that are present in 
large supply. The implication is that, countries ‘endowed’ with a large labour supply 
should specialize in labour-intensive products such as raw materials and primary 
commodities, whereas countries ‘endowed’ with capital and technology should specialise 
in capital-intensive, technology-intensive, products. The scene was therefore set for 
states to receive and ‘translate’ the reformulated free trade wisdom, which crucially 
provided the theoretical basis for the post-war international division of labour into 
multilateral trade law. 
 
 
20 HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF 
CAPITALISM 23-40 (2007) [hereinafter Chang]. 
21 Id. at 24-25. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 4. 
24 Id. The tariffs were increased from 37% in 1925 to 48% in 1930. 
25 MARK BLAUG, The Heckscher–Ohlin theory of international trade, in THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS: 
OR, HOW ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 185, 185 (2d ed. 1992). 
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Yet, as we shall see, the extent to which states departed from the selective liberalisation 
practices of the past needs to be closely scrutinised. Most trade scholars would agree that 
the GATT did not realise a ‘pure’ free trade order overnight, since free trade was taken 
to be the horizon, but states were provided with time-limited exceptions to assist with 
the journey. However, whilst some of these exceptions could be explained in terms of 
temporary departures from free trade, put in place to assist the liberalisation journey - 
this is particularly the case with the infant industry argument,26 Keynes’ unemployment 
argument,27 and Chamberlain and Robinson’s claim of imperfect market 
competition,28others cannot be explained in this light. Indeed, the latter exceptions 
represented a fundamental departure from free trade thinking that ended up 
contradicting the theory’s own logic of universal validity and applicability as well as its 
claims of universal gains. We therefore need to consider factors external to the theory 
itself, in order to make sense of this contradiction. While the next sub-part illustrates this 
‘contradiction’, the one following it introduces elements external to the theory, in 
particular, the end of formal colonial rule and the beginning of economic and political 
sovereignty over resources for the soon-to-be independent countries. 
 
B. Enters Trade Law: The Limits of Non-Discrimination and Equal Treatment. 
 
 
26 The infant industry argument challenges the free trade assumption that all countries know what their 
comparative advantage is at any moment, and that this advantage is given by current rates of technological 
development. It posits that states where industries are not well established find it difficult to compete 
internationally even though they might become efficient once these industries are well established and can 
avail itself of economies of scale. A temporary departure may therefore be needed to enable these 
industries to be in that position. This argument emerged in the context of the American colonies when 
Hamilton rejected Smith’s recommendation to specialise in agricultural production to enable its 
manufacturing to take off. The departure is therefore valid until industries have reached ‘maturity’ and are 
able to compete internationally. At that point, free trade is re-instated as the best theory informing policy 
action. See Chang, supra note 20. 
27 Keynes’ argument challenged the assumption that all factors of production (i.e. labour, land, raw 
materials, capital) are employable at any time. Keynes argued that there are circumstances in which this 
does not happen, as in the case of involuntary unemployment (i.e. people willing to work but not able to 
find employment). Involuntary unemployment, according to him, took place because of a shortage of 
aggregate demand which instigated a downward spiral of income, demand and production: workers were 
laid off; their purchasing power decreased, as well as their demands of consumer goods; firms made more 
employees redundant because of lack of demand, and the cycle continued. The point of Keynes’ argument 
was that there are circumstances which demand a temporary departure from free trade to stimulate 
employment, income, domestic demand and therefore, production. If consumers could go for cheaper 
imported products, then domestic demand and production would not be stimulated by government 
intervention. As soon as domestic demand, employment and production resumed, tariff protection would 
be lifted. See Alessandrini Transnational, supra note 18. 
28 See EDWARD CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 349 (1929); JOAN 
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 307 (1931). Robinson and Chamberlain’s 
argument challenged one of the core assumptions of free trade that is the belief that markets function in a 
state of perfect competition where atomistic producers respond to the needs expressed by atomistic 
consumers which therefore creates the demand that producers satisfy. Robinson and Chamberlain’s 
analysis of imperfect competition showed that in reality, markets oscillate somewhere between pure 
competition and monopoly. Indeed, if we take into account the activity of oligopolistic producers then the 
result is a more fundamental challenge to the intellectual superiority of free trade thinking in that it shows 
that demand, production and prices are actually shaped by the activities of big conglomerates that are able 
to influence prices but also shape consumers’ tastes and preferences through market power, advertising 
and other means. The implication is that, there is no comparative advantage-led allocation of worldwide 
resources on the basis of which all states benefit from trading with one another. Unlike Hamilton and 
Keynes’ argument, the imperfect competition argument did not enter the discursive sphere of GATT law, 
except in the form of anti-dumping rules which aimed to target unfair trade practices. See Alessandrini 
Transnational, supra note 18. 
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GATT law is said to be governed by the principles of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment in trade relations. These principles are supposed to take the international trade 
community as close as possible to the workings of comparative advantage by enabling 
market prices to reflect real prices more closely, so that countries specialise in goods, 
which they are efficient in producing. How? There are four legal rules that are supposed 
to give effect to these principles. Most Favored Nation (MFN) is the obligation to not 
discriminate amongst ‘like’ (similar) foreign goods; and National Treatment (NT) targets 
the discrimination between ‘like’ domestic and foreign goods once the latter have crossed 
the border. The obligation to reduce tariffs reduces discrimination against ‘like’ foreign 
goods before they enter the country, and the obligation to eliminate quantitative 
restrictions on imports (and exports) does away with the most distortive protectionist 
measure, that is, a partial or total ban.29 Underlying all these rules is the assumption that, 
for comparative advantage to work and deliver gains for all, market prices need to reflect 
real prices. Therefore, the actions targeted by the rules are those which artificially 
construct that advantage, thereby preventing free trade from delivering its twin promise 
of most efficient allocation of worldwide resources and the greatest generation of 
material wealth.  
 
As mentioned above, the GATT contemplated some exceptions to these rules, for 
instance: it allowed states to raise tariffs and impose quantitative restrictions for balance 
of payment purposes; when a sudden surge of imports resulting from liberalising 
commitments threatened to cause material injury to the domestic industry, it gave firms a 
time-limited protection to adjust, or otherwise perish;30 and when unfair trade practices 
such as dumping were believed to confer an unfair (i.e. artificially constructed) advantage 
to exporters.31 
 
What one can infer from analysing GATT obligations and their exceptions is the belief 
that trade liberalisation is a positive strategy when coupled with an appropriate state 
intervention.32 This is not a new observation. What is less acknowledged, however, is the 
fact that whilst this legal apparatus can be explained in terms of liberal trade cum state 
intervention (i.e. the emerging Keynesian or ‘embedded liberalism’ consensus of the 
post-war period) there is one particular set of exceptions from the rules that can be 
explained neither in terms of the free trade theory (with due adjustments) nor in terms of 
Keynesian consensus. The agricultural and fishery exceptions, which were followed in 
the 1960s by the textile exception, cannot be explained in terms of the time-limited 
exceptions touched upon in this part,33 since these were the sectors in which, according 
to the neo-classic re-conceptualisation of the free trade theory and the resulting post-war 
international division of labour, certain countries (i.e. former colonies) were supposed to 
have their ‘comparative advantage’. The universality of free trade resides upon this very 
basis that, all countries have an advantage in trading with one another because of a 
 
29 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT, 1947] arts. I, III, XXVIII and XI respectively.  
30 The adjustment rationale is consistent with the free trade theory: firms are given the time to adjust to the 
reduction of the protection that they have enjoyed thus far, but if they are unable to do so, they are 
considered inefficient and bound to become extinct.  
31 ‘Dumping’ is the practice of selling a product in the export market at a price lower than the one applied 
in the domestic market. Although not necessarily the case, it is often assumed to be motivated by predatory 
intent (i.e. attempt to force out competition) and was disciplined by GATT Art. VI when it resulted in a 
material injury to the domestic industry. 
32 This was also a consensus regarding the first moment of Law and Development. See Trubek & Santos, 
supra note 3. 
33 See Chang, supra note 20. 
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comparative advantage in the production of certain goods, with the ‘‘factor endowment’’ 
theory suggesting that it was those goods which made more use of the abundant factors 
of production. We therefore need another lens to make sense of this strange amalgam of 
theory, law and practice, one that looks at it in a historic context and acknowledges the 
links between trade, development, and post-colonialism.34 
 
 
C. Colonialism, Trade and Development: The Missing Link 
 
The first time we encounter the term ‘development’ within the multilateral trade arena is 
in the context of the Havana Conference of 1946 in which seven so-called ‘less 
developed’ countries participated. We will see how these countries objected to the 
agricultural and fishery exceptions and how the rules entered into force as originally 
drafted, nonetheless. For the time being, there are three aspects of this early engagement 
I want to pause on, because they say a lot about the trade-development nexus that this 
article is trying to describe. 
 
The first aspect concerns the historic and institutional separation between the political 
and economic realms of the international legal order which was about to be set up. The 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference led to the creation of the United Nations (UN) whilst the 
Bretton Woods Conference was supposed to create the three legs of the post-war 
international economic system: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO). The latter never materialised because of the refusal of the US Senate 
to ratify its charter.35 What came into force in its place was the GATT, whose rules were 
negotiated principally between the US and the United Kingdom (UK).36 Once an 
agreement on the legal norms described earlier was reached between the two powers, 
negotiations were made open to the rest of the world in 1946. The vast majority of the 
countries of the world at this point were still under colonial rule and in fact acceded to 
the GATT after independence by means of an accession mechanism negotiated on their 
behalf by their former colonial rulers.37 
 
The seven ‘less-developed’ countries were therefore those, which had already acquired 
independence or had not been subjected to formal colonial rule.38 When the text was 
shared with them, they objected to it because agricultural exports was the sector in which 
 
34 The argument that agriculture was singled out from liberalisation needs to be substantiated. The GATT 
distinguished between primary and non-primary products. Primary products are those which are derived 
from farm, forestry and fishery. Whereas the GATT law on non-primary products (i.e. industrial products) 
provided for a prohibition of QRs (art XI); export subsidies were highly disciplined (states could use so-
called countervailing measures) and reduction of tariffs took place through successive rounds of 
negotiations; the law was different for primary products as QRs were allowed, subject to two conditions, 
and so were subsidies, whereas tariffs were not reduced.   
35 This was due to the investment provisions, particularly those on expropriation, which were considered to 
be not sufficiently protective of US investment abroad. See WILLIAM A. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE ITO CHARTER AND 
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 152 (1950) [hereinafter Brown]. 
36 A few other countries were involved. See RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: 
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 491, 493 
(1956).  
37 See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 346 
(1970). 
38 These seven less developed countries were Cuba, Brazil, Russia, China, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Czechoslovakia.  
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they were supposed to have a comparative advantage.39 Their objection was dismissed on 
the basis that agriculture was a sensitive issue since it involved an access to food on 
which the survival of each country’s population relied, therefore making it eligible for a 
different treatment. Attempting to adopt a similar logic, the ‘less-developed’ countries 
argued that given their past of colonial exploitation and the fact that their manufacturing 
capacity had been destroyed or was inexistent, industrial goods could be considered to be 
their sensitive issue and therefore, they should be allowed to use exceptions to build their 
manufacturing capacity.40 This argument was also rejected with the ‘pragmatic’ point that 
if industry (in addition to agriculture) was singled out from liberalization, then there 
would be no point in having a liberalizing agreement such as the GATT at all, and that 
the GATT was in fact necessary as the bulk of international trade was in industrial goods. 
The other crucial argument advanced by the US was that, concerns expressed by these 
countries about colonialism were of a political nature and as such, they were to be dealt 
with by the UN.41 
 
What is interesting to note about the separation of political and economic issues is that it 
played differently, and had a different meaning for the countries involved, for instance, 
for the US, GATT law reflected an objective economic reality, i.e. the universal benefits 
of trade liberalisation, with the differential treatment between industrial and agricultural 
goods being framed as economic (i.e. the self-sufficiency rationale referred to above) 
rather than political. And yet, the very attempt to define matters as economic and 
political is one example of the dynamic through which a universal discourse of trade 
liberalisation supposedly based on objective economic grounds is in fact, the elevation of 
a particular socio-economic model (liberalisation of industrial goods on the one hand and 
protection of agriculture on the other)42 serving particular interests and realising 
particular socio-economic effects - to which the international trade community as a 
whole needs to conform. 
 
It is also important to note that the way in which matters are defined as economic or 
political has shifted,43 however, the ability to define what counts as economic and 
political still remains an important way to exercise power. Claims to knowledge (what 
counted as sectors to be liberalised and what did not) enabled particular forms of 
interventions: the markets of ex-colonies were kept open for industrial goods coming 
from the industrialised countries but the latter continued to protect themselves from 
agricultural goods coming from the former. Additionally, matters framed as economic 
were de facto elevated over those framed as political through the supposed neutrality of 
the growth imperative and the consequent trade for growth axiom (growth becomes the 
pre-requisite for any other kind of political intervention, such as poverty alleviation, 
socio-economic equality, etc). 
 
The second aspect, worthy of our attention, is that to an extent the seven ‘less developed’ 
countries identified themselves with the reality of ‘underdevelopment’, which was 
considered as the lack of economic growth, and they accepted the consequent need for 
 
39 See Brown, supra note 35, at 633-35. 
40 They were, in other words, invoking the infant industry argument. See id. 
41 Brown, supra note 35. 
42 For one of the most nuanced accounts of the relationship between international trade governance and 
food security and hunger, see Anne Orford, Food Security, Free Trade, and the Battle for the State, 11(2) J. INT’L 
L. & INT’L REL. 1, 67 (2015). 
43 See Fiona Macmillan, Critical Law and Development, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRITICAL LEGAL 
THEORY 428-445 (Emilios Christodoulidis et al. eds., 2018); Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and 
Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, 26(1) MICH. J. INT’L. L. 199, 243 (2004). 
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trade to stimulate that growth so as to become developed. In other words, they accepted 
their ‘economic backwardness’ and the need to overcome it.44 Pahuja has referred to 
international law more generally, and has pointed out that, while seeking admittance to 
the international community and to be able to affect international law, the soon-to-be 
newly independent states accepted being identified as economically backward, as far as 
their economies were concerned, despite arguing that colonialism had greatly contributed 
to this status.45 
 
Whilst decolonisation was not a fait accompli in the early 1940s (indeed there were 
different views between Keynes and the US as to its desirability and feasibility),46 this 
self-identification would have become important in the 1950s and 1960s when the 
contours of the GATT-development related trade activity emerged. Before we turn to 
such activity and explore the reforms that the GATT underwent, in order to respond to 
the demands of its developing-country parties, there is a third aspect of this early 
moment, which is worth emphasising, and that is the fact that the attribution of a less than 
developed status to certain societies was quite a recent socio-legal-economic intervention. 
Appreciating the importance of such an intervention entails making the continuities with 
post-colonialism and its links to trade interests apparent, and this is crucial for 
understanding the strange amalgam of theory, law and practice, which I have referred to 
earlier. 
 
As post-development scholars have argued, both the terms, ‘underdevelopment’ and 
‘development’ were inextricably linked to a set of theories that came to be known as 
‘development economics’.47 In his seminal study, Escobar shows how development was 
made to coincide with economic growth generated by industrialisation, capital 
accumulation, state planning and foreign aid; and how societies which lacked 
accumulation and growth were seen as ‘underdeveloped’.48 Truman’s fourth point is 
often considered to signal the beginnings of the development enterprise.49 However, 
 
44 As Eslava, Fakhri and Nesiah have noted with regard to the Bandung Conference, that what united the 
very different positions of states attending the conference was a discourse of ‘developmentalism’. See 
BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES 3-32 
(Luis Eslava et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter LUIS ESLAVA]. 
45 See SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 250, 251 (2013) [hereinafter Pahuja]. Her argument is about the 
critical instability of international law, which has both imperial and anti-imperial tendencies, the latter 
springing from the relationship that international law has with the idea of justice (what she calls the 
political quality of law), but being curtailed by developmentalism. 
46 Id. at 13-15. 
47 Although the antecedents of development economics can be brought back to mercantilism with its focus 
on the supply of capital and a positive balance of trade, the emphasis of mercantilist theories is on 
countries’ prosperity rather than ‘development.’ One of the earliest interventions focusing on the specific 
issues of ‘underdeveloped’ economies can be found in Rostow, supra note 5. Published in the early years of 
the Cold War, it sees the need to accelerate the accumulation of capital as paramount.  For critical 
engagements with this literature, see, ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING 
AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD (1995) [hereinafter Escobar]; JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-
POLITICS MACHINE: DEVELOPMENT, DEPOLITICISATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO 
(1994); GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO GLOBAL FAITH 
(Zed 1997). 
48 See Escobar, supra note 47 at 73-89.  
49 See Text of the Speech in Department of State Bulletin, (Jan. 20, 1949), 123: “We must embark on a bold 
new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in 
conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life 
is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous 
areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these 
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‘development’ conceptualised as the dividing line between certain societies that are in 
need of assistance and others providing such assistance can be traced further back.50As 
Anghie has argued, the first ever reference to ‘development’ in an international 
organisation can be found in the League of Nations (LON), the precursor of the UN, 
and in particular in the sections on the Mandate System.51 Articles 22 and 23 of the LON 
are worth referring to here because they enable us to tell a story which is different from 
the one told thus far, the one about an international trade community which realises the 
intellectual superiority of free trade thought and translates this thinking into multilateral 
law and practice. Article 22 provided that: 
 
[t]o those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war 
have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly 
governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand for 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there 
should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such 
peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.52 
 
Anghie’s work, together with that of other TWAIL scholars, has pointed to the links 
between the Mandate System, from which former colonies were supposed to emerge and 
join the international community as equal states; the old colonial regime; and post-war 
international institutions.53 From a perspective that appreciates such continuities, Article 
22 can be read as replacing the old racial and cultural differences, on which much of the 
colonial violence and exploitation was based, with the new category of ‘economic 
backwardness’ which is believed to prevent ‘development’ from taking place. Economics, 
on which such ‘backwardness’ is supposed to be ‘neutrally’ grounded, happens to be the 
domain of the more ‘advanced’ members of the international community that take upon 
themselves the task of guiding these peoples through rational economic policies. When 
read together with Article 23, we can also appreciate that the reformulated ‘civilizing 
mission’, which Anghie highlights, can be seen as going hand in hand with a 
reformulated trade agenda that still consists of selective trade interests instead of 
universal liberalisation practices.  
 
Article 23 of the LON provides that it is the responsibility of the League and its 
members to “secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and 
equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League”; a language we see 
replicated in Article IV and V of the Atlantic Charter of 1941 where parties commit,“… 
to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on 
 
people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific 
techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. 
But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.” 
50 Pahuja, supra note 45, at 185-86. Pahuja remarks “Development is a story about human history in which 
a certain number of societies have, over time, achieved the most perfect forms of social, legal, political and 
economic organisation which could reasonably have been achieved by now, but which other societies have 
not yet achieved. According to this story, ‘society’, ‘law’, ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ in their ideal forms can 
be found in the knowledge, if not always the practice, of societies that have already achieved development 
and will slowly be achieved by other societies.”  
51 Antony Anghie, Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty, in LUIS ESLAVA, supra note 44 at 535, 
547-48 [hereinafter Anghie]. 
52 Covenant of the League of Nations art. 22(emphasis added). 
53 Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions and the Third 
World, 32(2) N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. POL. 243 (2000). 
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equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their 
economic prosperity.”54 
 
The conventional story reads that these articles proclaimed the end of the old colonial 
system of preferences which gave former colonial powers the exclusive right to access 
material resources in former colonies. With non-discrimination and equal treatment 
being adopted as universal principles regulating post-war trade relations, these articles, as 
well as those of the GATT as referred to above, are considered as an evidence of both, 
the translation of a neutral (and superior) economic rationale into practice and of the 
moral repudiation of the past of colonial exploitation. However, the continuities that 
Anghie has highlighted, as well as the changing political-economic environment brought 
about by the imminent end of both, formal colonial rule and World War II, enable us to 
present a different story. If we start the story with colonial rule and its imminent end, we 
can see other factors playing an important role. Escobar for instance, has emphasised 
upon how important it was for the US (and former colonial powers) to access foreign 
markets, in order to extract raw materials and place excess commodities and capital.55 
This meant that the old colonial system of exclusive preferences had to go.  
 
Equally important to note is that non-discrimination and equal treatment in trade 
relations have a long historic lineage, and the claim, that these principles were connected 
to the rejection of the old system of colonial exploitation and the acceptance of the free 
trade theory requires further scrutiny. Despite being gauged in neutral and universal 
terms, they refer to particular interests that are realised by presenting the material 
resources of specific countries as ‘common resources’, and international legal theories 
and rules have played an important part in this process. Esmeir for instance, has shown 
how Grotious’ 1609 Mare Liberum conceived of the sea as free and open to the trade of 
all nations, and how his formulation was instrumental in facilitating Dutch trade with the 
East Indies, which laid the basis for its subsequent formal colonisation against the 
Portuguese claims to exclusive rights.56 Esmeir argues: 
 
The coloniality of the Free Sea… persists today in the field of international 
law. According to this colonial vision, the oceans and the seas are not merely 
free and common to all humans. Their freedom is the constitutive cement 
for staging an enlarged world; they produce a unified world and, more 
significantly, special-political possibilities for capturing it and intervening in 
it.57 
 
Therefore, another way to read Article 23 of the LON and Article IV and V of the 
Atlantic Charter of 1941, is to see them as playing an active role in the extension of the 
concept of the ‘‘commons’’ from the ‘‘high seas’’ to the resources of the land. As already 
mentioned, it is not certain whether GATT rules were designed keeping in mind, a 
particular international division of labour between ex-colonies and ex-colonial powers 
because there was no agreement as to the end of colonialism between Britain and the US 
back then. Once the GATT entered into force, it became clear that the effects of these 
(supposedly universal) rules were perceived to be such that they would penalise the trade 
 
54 The Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14 1941, Department of State Bulletin (Washington DC, Government 
Printing Office, 1941) (emphasis added).  
55 Escobar, supra note 47. 
56 Samera Esmeir, Bandung: Reflection on the Sea, the World and Colonialism, in LUIS ESLAVA, supra note 44, at 
81-94 [hereinafter Esmeir]. 
57 Id. at 85. 
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interests of developing countries whilst promoting those of industrialised countries. This 
signaled the moment the GATT started to engage its developing country contracting 
parties’ calls for reforming the rules of the international economic system. 
 
 
III. THE ‘PROGRESSIVE TIME’ OF THE TRADE-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS 
 
As more countries achieved independence in the 1950s and 1960s, they came to 
articulate a collective position within the GATT, and the international economic system 
more broadly, which exposed the way in which international trade rules promoted 
unequal trade relations between ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries.58 This position 
highlighted three important aspects of such unequal relations: first, whilst expected to 
adhere to a multilateral system of rules based on free trade thinking, developing countries 
found that the sectors in which they were supposed to have a comparative advantage, 
were singled out from liberalisation; second, developing countries were not allowed to 
protect their nascent industries (i.e. the infant industry argument) which meant that they 
were not able to compete with industrial products coming from industrialised countries 
as the latter could avail themselves of economies of scale and be therefore cheaper; and 
third, more and more countries achieving independence had to compete with a fixed 
demand for raw materials and the primary commodities from industrialised countries, 
which meant that prices and consequently their export earnings were decreasing.  
 
With this background in mind, I highlight two elements of GATT-related development 
activity that are important for the story about the trade-development nexus, which is 
being told.  The first is that, as a forum, the GATT enabled claims to be made about the 
structural inequalities of the trading system and reform projects to be articulated within 
it; and this points to important discontinuities with colonial forms of unidirectional 
knowledge production and intervention. The second is that, the potential of making 
claims about structural inequalities was curtailed by the particular dynamic of the trade-
development nexus we have been describing thus far, that is the elevation of a particular 
(i.e. trade for growth) rationale, and of selective trade interests, to universal standings. 
This was possible due to the positing of three elements which provided the terms of the 
trade-development debate within the multilateral trade system: first, a ‘failure’, 
‘inadequacy’ or ‘lack’ which was said to affect the economies of developing countries; 
second, an economic rationale which was construed as the neutral terrain to remedy 
these shortcomings; and third, the expertise of more ‘developed’ members, institutions 




58 Characterising this position within the international economic system more broadly was the attempt to 
resist the identification of their resources as ‘commons’ or as available for the common benefits of 
mankind. Indeed, the UN resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States can be read in this light. See G.A Res. A/RES/3171, Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, (Dec. 17, 1973). Claims concerned in particular, the areas of 
investment and trade. With regard to the emergent international law on foreign investment, see 
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 19 (1994).  
As for trade, countries sought to stabilise commodity prices since the 1950s. Point 5 of the Bandung 
Communique for instance, called for collective action among members directed at stabilising commodity 
prices “through bilateral and multilateral arrangements” and for the diversification of their export trade 
through their processing of the raw materials prior to their export. See Anghie, supra note 51, at 535, 547-
48.  
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As for the first element, it became increasingly evident that there was a profound 
inconsistency between the theoretical apparatus and the rules and practices of the 
GATT. This perception was confirmed by the Haberler Report which concluded that 
industrialised countries were actively hindering developing countries’ trade.59 What is 
interesting to note, and this takes us to the second element, is that the Haberler 
Committee was specifically tasked with investigating the ‘failure’ of developing countries 
in developing their trade as fast as that of the industrialised countries, rather than, one 
could argue, investigating the failure of industrialised countries themselves to abide by 
the rationale that they proclaimed as universally valid and beneficial, and which they had 
enshrined into their law. Whilst the committee concluded that the reasons for this 
‘failure’ were to be found in the industrialised countries’ unfair trade practices as much as 
in the letter of the GATT law,60 and the acknowledgement of these reasons eventually 
led to the establishment of Part IV of the GATT on Development, what was being 
placed beyond scrutiny was the very premise of this endeavor.61 The premise was that the 
developing countries needed to accelerate the pace of their trade in order to match that 
of industrialised countries, taken as the optimum level, to achieve growth; a particular 
norm was therefore posited as being universally valid. The ‘particularity’ of that norm 
concerns both: the free trade assumption - according to which free trade is the best trade 
theory because it leads to the maximisation of material wealth (i.e. more goods and 
services are produced and exchanged); and the development assumption - according to 
which countries at the end of the development spectrum should gradually move up the 
ladder by increasing growth, and the export earnings that it generates through 
international trade.62 What we encounter is the ‘progressive’ time of the trade-
development nexus: the movement from an inadequate to a more adequate place in the 
development ladder through the acceleration of the pace of international trade. 
 
This is not to say that these reforms did not produce important effects; as it will be 
shown below, they did. However, bearing in mind the second element about the 
curtailment of their potential, I want to emphasise, that leaving this rationality and its 
temporality undisturbed meant that the monopoly over knowledge (to start with, the 
claim that ‘development’ was to be achieved through trade for growth) allowed for the 
monopoly over the forms of intervention (as we shall see in the context of the 
establishment of the WTO when circumstances changed) and ultimately limited what 
was possible to experiment with. We look at the reforms first and then at the 
transformation that the establishment of the WTO entailed. 
 
59 The Haberler Report was the first GATT report on ‘developing countries’ by a committee of 
independent economists. See Twelfth Session of the Contracting Parties, (1957), GATT B.I.D.S. (6th Supp.), at 18 
(1958). 
60 Haberler focused on agriculture (high tariffs and quantitative restrictions), instability of commodity 
prices and tariff escalation, that is higher tariffs on processed products than raw materials (depending on 
the degree of processing), arguing that this activity hindered the industrialisation process of developing 
countries. It also highlighted the heavy usage of export subsidies by the US and Europe. See, GATT 
Secretariat, Trends in International Trade: A Report by a Panel of Experts’ (1958). 
61 Part IV however did not translate into legally binding obligations, and the negotiating rounds that 
followed did very little to reduce those tariff barriers that most impeded developing countries’ access to the 
markets of developed countries. See ROBERT E HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL 
SYSTEM 43 (1987). 
62 Central to this process is the accumulation of capital. Rostow for instance, had posited that for an 
economy to grow, the rate of productive investment has to correspond to at least 10% of its national 
income; and as developing countries did not possess sufficient income, they had to import capital to kick 
up the industrialisation process, which would, in turn, lead to exports and the resulting earnings to be re-
invested into a new cycle of production and capital accumulation. See WALT W. ROSTOW, THE PROCESS OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 80-108 (1962) [hereinafter Walt]. 
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A. The Terms and Content of the Trade-Development Nexus 
 
The first reform was the introduction of the infant industry exception in recognition of 
the developmental needs of some GATT parties. Although the conditions under which it 
could be exercised were very strict (and in fact, it was used only twice);63 scholars have 
argued that the same outcome was achieved through the introduction of Part IV and 
specifically the ‘non-reciprocity’ provision, which enabled the developing countries to 
support their industries because they did not have to reciprocate tariff reductions when 
the latter were negotiated by industrialised countries.64 The other provision requiring 
industrialised countries to eliminate those practices which discriminated against 
developing countries’ trade was hortatory rather than mandatory, which meant that the 
protection against developing countries’ exports remained firmly in place in industrialised 
countries during GATT’s life.65 The third provision enabled the developing countries to 
establish systems of preferences for South-South trade.66 Taken together, these 
development-related provisions are referred to as Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT). One cannot fail to notice the paradox with the terminology adopted since the 
original SDT was the one that the US and Britain carved out for themselves by 
exempting agriculture and fishery, and later textile,67 from ‘universal’ liberalisation.  
 
The conventional trade and development story however, is that SDT achieved very 
limited results for developing countries, particularly in terms of non-reciprocity, because 
by renouncing to abide by the same rules (i.e. reciprocity), developing countries missed 
the opportunity to demand that industrialised countries abide by those rules too and 
therefore eliminate their protectionism.68 This argument is believed to have led 
developing countries back into accepting reciprocal obligations under the WTO. The 
story is therefore, one of realisation of mistakes made in relation to the adoption of 
failing economic policies and inadequate legal strategies; and, as seen before in relation to 
the adoption of the GATT, one of acceptance of a superior economic rationality which 
is deemed to be straightforwardly translatable into law and practice. The debate about 
unequal terms of trade and the structural inequality of the multilateral trading system 
fades in the background and what emerges instead is an argument about the need for 
developing countries to secure ‘market access’ to, and compete on an ‘equal playing field’ 
with, developed countries. In particular, obtaining access to agricultural markets in 
developed economies is believed to deliver development. 
 
Now, the results of non-reciprocity are mixed. While some scholars observe that 
flexibility from GATT rules has allowed for policy space which has in turn enabled 
countries (especially in Asia and Africa) to experience unprecedented levels of growth 
and industrialisation;69 others have either contradicted this view or argued that the 
benefits from tariff protection and industrial policy were not as substantial as they would 
have been, if countries had liberalised more extensively.70 Towards the end of the 1980s, 
 
63 GATT 1947, supra note 29, art. XVIII. 
64 GATT 1947, supra note 29, art. XXXVI. 
65 See Walt, supra note 62, at 56.  
66  Trebilcock et al, supra note 1, at 608-9; See Alessandrini, supra note 4, at 60.  
67 Walt, supra note 62, at 43. 
68 Id. at 58; Matsushita, supra note 1, at 373-93; See Hoekman & Kostecki, supra note 1, at 239-40.  
69 See, Chang, supra note 20; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Prebisch Lecture by 
Dani Rodrik, on Globalisation, Social Conflict and Economic Growth UNCTAD (97/1) (Oct. 24, 1997).  
70 See, e.g., DEEPAK LAL, LONDON, INST. OF ECON. AFF., THE POVERTY OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 
27 (1983); ANNE KRUEGER, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3-4 
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the latter argument prevailed, supposedly leading to the acceptance of reciprocity within 
the WTO and the extension of the free trade logic to more realms. However, this story 
about a shared wisdom that translated into multilateral law and practice, needs to be 
interrogated, as it obfuscates the role that various other historic, political, economic, and 
legal factors played in the adoption of the WTO agreements. I briefly mention them and 
then highlight how, despite the change in the content of the trade-development nexus, its 
terms remained firm in place enabling a particular story about the ‘free market’ and a 
‘level playing field’ to be elevated to universal standings, while the pursuit of selective 
trade interests continued to take place. 
 
To start with, by the time the WTO came into existence, the trade regimes of many 
developing states had already liberalised as a result of the Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs) that they had to undergo to get their debts rescheduled. Developing countries 
had borrowed heavily from US commercial banks, which were eager to lend funds after 
being inundated with petrodollars following the oil crisis of the early 1970s. Borrowing 
had been encouraged by the development theories of the 50s and 60s, which had 
identified the lack of domestic capital as an obstacle to industrialisation, which was to be 
overcome by resorting to foreign capital.71 The inability of these countries to repay their 
debt, signaled first by Mexico in the early 1980s, followed the so-called “Volcker shock” 
which raised interest rates in the US overnight.72 This rise was orchestrated by the 
Federal Reserve in an attempt to curb inflation at home as the administration turned 
away from Keynesianism and embraced monetarism to deal with the crisis of 
stagflation.73 With interest rates increasing tenfold, many countries found themselves on 
the brink of bankruptcy: the restructuring of debt ‘offered’ by international economic 
institutions such as the World Bank was made dependent on these countries’ acceptance 
of so-called conditionalities like: deregulation, privatisation, reduction of public spending 
and liberalisation of their trade regimes.74 In other words, debt restructuring was 
supported as long as these states recognised that their industrial policies (such as those 
based on the infant industry argument and non- reciprocity) had resulted in economic 
failure and needed to be replaced by policies of export-led growth (i.e. growth through 
export earnings).  
 
This is a very cursory account of the rich web of factors that led to the re-introduction of 
reciprocity within the multilateral trade system. The end of the Cold War, for example, 
played as much of a role as the shift in comparative advantage and the concomitant loss 
of competitiveness in manufacturing experienced by industrialised countries vis-à-vis the 
newly industrialised countries.75 Claims about ‘unfair trade’ practices started to be 
 
(1993). For a different critique of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), highlighting how it challenged 
neither the imperative to accumulate (national) capital nor the modernisation logic that required developing 
countries to ‘catch up’, see, Luis Eslava, The Developmental State: Independence, Dependency and the History of the 
South, in THE BATTLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE DECOLONISATION ERA (J. Von Bernstorff & P. 
Dann eds., 2019). 
71 Escobar, supra note 47, at 55. 
72 Tayyab Mahmood, Is it Greek or Deja Vu All Over Again?: Neoliberalism, and Winners and Losers of 
International Debt Crises  42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 629, 687 (2011). 
73 The co-existence of high rates of unemployment and high rates of inflation was seen as unprecedented 
and was considered to be a sign of the failure of Keynesianism and its tolerance of higher rates of inflation 
in return for low unemployment.  
74 See Celine Tan, Reframing the Debate: The Debt Relief Initiative and New Normative Values in the Governance of 
Third World Debt, 10(2) INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 249, 272 (2014). 
75 Anti-dumping duties were increasingly being used to allegedly target the ‘unfair trade’ practices of 
countries which instead claimed that cheaper prices were the outcome of efficiency gains. See  Alessandrini, 
supra note 4, at 117-18. 
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articulated by industrialised countries and relied upon, to enact protectionist measures, in 
a manner not too dissimilar from the rhetoric of unfair trade practices employed by more 
recent US administrations.76 As Lang has pointed out, in addition to these material 
factors, one also has to consider the role that ideas, particularly those articulated by trade 
lawyers, played in the reconfiguration of the purpose of the multilateral trade system.77 
While the GATT had seen itself as policing measures affecting international trade in a 
patently discriminatory manner, the WTO was able to construe a whole range of 
domestic policies concerning services, investment, IP rights, food, animal safety, and the 
environment as ‘trade barriers’ potentially subject to its discipline. The key move, he 
argues, was: 
 
to define a barrier to trade primarily in terms of its economic effects, rather 
than its form or intention [as it had been during the GATT]. In this 
approach, a governmental action constituted a barrier to trade if –and to the 
extent that- it ‘distorted’ the conditions of competition … as compared to 
the conditions of competition which would exist in an imagined ‘free’ 
market...78 
 
This idea of a market ‘free’ from government intervention was ‘imagined’ in more than 
one sense, not only because it did not exist in actual practice since governments rarely 
gave up their regulatory powers, but more importantly because it was used to construe 
“institutional and regulatory differences between foreign markets and the domestic US 
market …as ‘distortions’ of conditions of competition between foreign products and 
their domestic US counterparts”.79 Finally, it was imagined because even after giving up 
non-reciprocity and ‘accepting’ the need for a ‘level playing field’ in trade relations, 
selective and not full liberalisation continued to be the norm within the WTO, as the 
Doha Development Round has shown since 2001.80 Thus, as we have seen in the context 
of the GATT and in relation to the introduction of the principles of non-discrimination 
and equal treatment, multilateral trade law did much more than simply receive or 
translate a ‘common sense’ - in this case about an imagined ‘free’ market and ‘equal 
playing field’ - into law; it actually contributed to making it. 
 
Rather than being the result of one single factor, however, the extension of the free trade 
rationale to more areas of policy-making was the outcome of the confluence of very 
different historic, political and economic factors. The one which I have chosen to 
emphasise in this article because it is less dealt with by conventional trade and 
development accounts, is the framework that binds the two terms: trade and 
development together. A framework which relies on the positing of a universal economic 
rationality on the basis of which the ‘lack’, ‘failure’ or ‘inadequacy’ of certain systems can 
be addressed, aided by the expertise of international economic institutions. The problem 
is that, this framework creates a powerful form of knowledge reliant on a linear story of 
 
76See Barry Desker, Globalisation Under Pressure: International Trade Suffers (S. Rajaratnam Sch. Int’l. Stud. 
(NTU), RSIS Commentary No. 260, 2016). 
77ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE AFTER NEO-LIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER 223 (2011). 
78Id. at 226-27. 
79Id. 
80 For instance, agriculture remains highly protected despite the commitment to eliminate export subsidies 
achieved at Nairobi; services negotiations continue to exclude one modality (i.e. movement of natural 
persons) of major export interest to developing countries whilst focusing on services (especially financial) 
and modalities (commercial presence which pertains mainly to the establishment and operation of foreign 
investors); and no progress has been achieved on the liberalisation of cotton.   
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progress on which forms of intervention (such as the enactment of GATT/WTO rules) 
are made possible, and developing countries are in one way or another supposed to 
reform their inadequate regulatory systems to match those of developed countries. 
 
Instead of considering the cumulative effects of the different factors mentioned above, 
the focus on (trade for) growth and development enables attention to be shifted away 
from structural inequalities of the international system towards deficiencies of countries, 
in terms of inadequate economic policies and legal systems that need to be brought into 
conformity with those of developed countries, that are held as the example to replicate. 
The time that binds trade and development is therefore one of perennial inadequacy and 
the need for compliance. In addition to having to comply with new standards,81 
mechanisms such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and Integrated 
Framework (IF) ensure that countries’ legal regimes, and their compliance with WTO 
norms, are kept in check.82 Furthermore, in place of the old non-reciprocity, which 
implicitly acknowledged inequalities in the multilateral trading system, we have SDT  re-
conceptualised to mean longer transitional periods and technical assistance to provide 
‘developing’ countries with the ‘time’ and ‘expertise’ needed to bring their regimes into 
compliance with the WTO law.  The rationale informing this law, however, is not open 
for questioning and the trade for growth axiom becomes stronger than ever: services and 
investment liberalisation on the one hand, and protection of IP rights on the other, is the 
way forward to deliver the maximisation of material wealth.  
 
The WTO’s re-conceptualisation of SDT and the acceptance of reciprocity was called 
into question with the launch of the first round of negotiations in 2001, dubbed the 
Doha Development Round, which is still ongoing. Among the several concerns 
expressed by developing countries is the fact that, the promise of a level playing field has 
not materialised, and their exports continue to be discriminated against whilst the new 
agreements on services, investment-related trade measures and IP rights have provided 
the first multilateral framework for the protection of investors’ rights; which is why, 
among the specific concerns that the Round was supposed to address, the need to make 
SDT more effective and operational was one of them. During the Ministerial Conference 
at Cancun in 2003, we witnessed a resurgence of developing countries’ coalitions which 
have opposed the further strengthening of the international protection afforded to 
foreign investors sought by ‘developed’ countries whilst seeking to obtain stronger and 
more effective SDT provisions.83 
 
There are however, two notes of caution that I want to end the story with: the first is 
that developing countries’ opposition to this enlarged mandate has resulted in 
 
81 IP standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical standards and regulations; shipment 
inspection rules etc. mandated by several WTO agreements are the ones which had already been adopted 
by ‘developed’ countries.   
82 The TPRM for instance, monitors compliance of members with WTO law; and the IF encourages least 
developed countries ‘to become full and active players and beneficiaries of the multilateral trading system’.  
WTO, Integrated Framework Fact Sheet, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/if_factsheet_e.htm. 
83 In Singapore, an attempt was made to further enhance the protection of foreign investors, as well as to 
agree on the regulation of so-called trade facilitation, competition and government procurement. See J.S. 
Odell, The Seattle Impasse and its implications, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT HUDEC 403 (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002). 
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‘developed’ countries pursuing their agenda through bilateral and regional treaties.84 The 
rise of the so-called mega treaties points in this direction, with stronger investors’ rights 
set through treaties such as the now defunct Trans – Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
concluded by strong trading partners with a view to gradually attract those members that 
are reliant on access to their markets.85 The second is the fact that, as Faundez has 
pointed out, coalitions between developing countries are much more difficult to forge 
and maintain today than they were in the past because of the sheer variety of issues 
regulated by the WTO compared to those that the GATT dealt with. This means that 
developed and developing countries are not just opposed but are also aligned on specific 
issues.86 He also invites us to reassess GATT’s history in relation to the policy space that 
it is believed to have provided countries with, and see that regional blocs (or spheres of 
influence) rather than multilateral trade liberalisation, have been the norm in the post-war 
period, arguing that this bloc mentality is resurfacing now more evidently. He therefore, 
raises the question of whether the developing/developed countries distinction within the 
multilateral trade system is outdated; and concludes that it is not, because of the 
normative force that ‘development’ exerts as developing countries continue to be 
addressed, and many continue to identify themselves within the multilateral trade 
system.87 
 
Whether or not old and new coalitions will be formed and around what specific issues 
will they be formed remains to be seen. This article has highlighted one modality that 
binds trade and development together, a characteristic of which is its positing of a 
universal economic rationality, on the basis of which the ‘lack’, ‘failure’ or ‘inadequacy’ of 
certain systems can be remedied and the normative force that Faundez refers to can be 
exerted. The reverberations of this modality can be seen at play in current theoretical 
debates about the changes in the nature of global trade and the resulting policy 
prescriptions concerning development. 
 
 
B. Value Chain Trade and the New Development Wisdom 
 
Theoretical innovations in the field of trade theory have recently pointed to the fact that 
GVCs are challenging the state-centric focus of neo-classical trade theories and the 
multilateral trade law based on it, pointing to the increasing irrelevance of concepts such 
as the international division of labour and the developing/developed country distinction 
built on it.88 The argument is that, the pace, level, range, and intensity of global 
interactions are rapidly changing with value chain trade, consisting of the ever more 
functional ‘fractionalisation’ and geographical ‘dispersion’, destined to replace inter-
national trade (i.e. exchange of products manufactured almost entirely within national 
 
84 See Wang Yong, The Political Economy of the Rise of Mega-regionals, in MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: GAME-CHANGERS OR COSTLY DISTRACTIONS FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM? 20 (Global 
Agenda Council on Trade & Foreign Direct Inv., World Econ. F. ed., 2014). 
85 For the crucial significance of securing market access to big markers by countries whose economies are 
dependent on exports, see DIANA TUSSIE & MARCELO SAGUIER, THE SWEEP OF ASYMMETRIC TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS (2011); See also Ooife Donoghue & Ntina Tzouvala, TTIP: The Rise of ‘Mega-Market’ Trade 
Agreements and its Potential Implications for the Global South, 8(2) TRADE L. & DEV. 30 (2016). 
86 See Julio Faundez, Between Bandung and Doha’ in Bandung, Global History and International Law, in LUIS 
ESLAVA, supra note 44, at 508-14. 
87 Id. 
88 See Rory Horner & Matthew Alford, The Roles of the State in Global Value Chains: an Update and Emerging 
Agenda (U. Manchester, GDI Working Paper Series, 2019-036, 2019).  
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borders).89 Within the fields of business, economics, and statistics for instance, the claim 
is that these changes have profound development implications for the multilateral trade 
community.90 
 
What is needed, according to this narrative, is an appreciation that ‘development’ today 
entails the ability of the states to create a regulatory environment that enables efficient 
companies to insert themselves in GVCs and ‘technologically upgrade’ so as to attract a 
greater share in the value added produced along these chains. The WTO’s commissioned 
report on GVCs, for instance, makes a clear recommendation: as GVCs are the result of 
inevitable economic and technological processes, it becomes important to accept a new 
set of rules supposed to facilitate and expand the value – chain trade.91 Referred to as the 
‘WTO-extra’ provisions because they go well beyond the current liberalisation 
commitments, these rules consist of the strengthening of the protection of investors’ 
rights and the free movement of capital. The acceptance of such ‘wisdom’ and its 
translation into law is also believed to be necessary to prevent the collapse of the 
multilateral trade system as major trading partners pursue their agenda outside the WTO 
given the negotiating impasse of its Doha Round.92  
 
Indeed, the underlying argument is that these changes have been inadequately 
understood to date, particularly by developing countries, with the result that world trade 
governance is shifting away from multilateralism, thereby eroding the centrality of the 
WTO as the pre-eminent contemporary rule-maker. Now, the reality of global value 
trade requires much more research than I was able to carry out in this article. Some 
questions include: whether value–chain trade accounts for the majority of global trade as 
it is claimed; whether a technological upgrade and the insertion of developing countries’ 
firms into established chains has so far resulted in a greater share of the value accruing to 
such firms; and what have been the effects of this restructuring on workers’ conditions 
and well-being.93 What we can already detect, however, are the similarities that this 
argument displays with the modalities which we have described in this article according 
to which a failure is posited, once again, on the part of certain countries’ legal and 
economic regimes, and a solution is offered on the basis of an objective economic reality, 
this time that of a value chain trade.  
 
89 Gary Hamilton & Gary Gereffi, Global Commodity Chains, Market Makers, and the Rise of Demand-Responsive 
Economies, in FRONTIERS OF COMMODITY CHAIN RESEARCH 144 (Jennifer Bair ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
Jennifer Bair]. 
90 Id. 
91 Richard Baldwin, Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They are Going, in 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD 13 (D. Elms & P. Low eds., 2013). 
92 There are other issues that have impacted the protracted duration of the Doha round (which this article 
has not engaged with), including the US insistence that the WTO prevent some states from adopting the 
‘developing country’ status (see Alex Wayne, Trump Wants to Strip China of its ‘Developing Nation’ WTO Status, 
AL JAZEERA (July 27, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/trump-strip-china-developing-nation-
wto-status-190726205231578.html; the rise of protectionist narratives (see Frederick Mayer & Nicola 
Phillips, Global Inequality and the Trump Administration, 45(3) REV. INT. STUDIES 502-510 (2019); the increase 
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developing countries (see Biswajit Dhar, The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): An 
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comprehensive). 
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conditions). See Kate Raworth & Thalia Kidder, Mimicking 'Lean' in Global Value Chains: It's the Workers Who 




I conclude by reiterating that this story is a partial one as there are other lenses that could 
have been adopted to look at the trade-development nexus. I could have for instance 
emphasised upon the spatial dimension of the nexus, paying attention to the connections 
that have made the world economy since colonial times, and in particular, the role played 
by the compulsion to accumulate capital (which I have referred to but have not 
adequately explored). Another point for further analysis could have been the fact that 
some countries experimented with different socio-economic systems under the GATT 
and still do, under the WTO;94 and that these systems were not entirely geared towards 
growth maximisation or capital accumulation. 
 
It is however, important to note that this article has focused on the temporal dimension 
of the trade-development nexus, to make two observations. The first is that the time of 
the trade-development nexus has a much longer history than what is often acknowledged 
in the trade and development section of most textbooks on the subject; and the second is 
that this history has a specific temporal quality which shares its origins with the colonial 
encounter, and which continues to exert its effects within the multilateral trade system, in 
a non–predetermined and always different manner, when a certain confluence of factors 
enables its operation.  
 
What the GATT and the WTO do have in common is the fact that, despite all their 
development – related trade activity (including the nineteen years long Doha 
Development Round), ‘development’ remains yet to be achieved. One could go with the 
conventional story that if only market access was duly granted to developing countries 
and the comparative advantage was left free to operate this time through insertion into 
GVCs and technological upgradation, then the multilateral trading system would finally 
be able to deliver development.  
 
Alternatively, this article has argued that if one looks at the trade-development nexus in a 
different way - highlighting the discontinuities and continuities with the colonial period 
concerning both the selective trade interests being pursued and a reformulated ‘civilizing 
mission’ based on the positing of undisputed ‘inadequacy’, ‘lack’ or ‘failure’ on the part of 
developing countries’ legal and economic regimes, one gets a different story. This is a 
story that sees the nexus working in a way that elevates, at certain moments in time, 
particular ways of seeing the world by asserting their universal validity and applicability, 
and that makes the promise of development anew, each time. 
 
This story should however not be treated as one, which presents an all-encompassing 
and inescapable dynamic or logic. This is an important point, particularly if we want to 
think of desirable alternatives to the current multilateral trade system that neither uphold 
the undisputed superiority and universal validity of trade liberalisation nor retreat into the 
defense of nationalistic interests through protectionist policies. Thinking about the 
resurgence of the latter approach, this story could lead one to conclude that the pursuit 
of selective trade policies informed by national interests is what has always been at stake, 
confirming that post-war multilateralism has been an illusion, and that what we are 
witnessing today is a more realistic, if less palatable, description of inter/national trade 
and relations. Yet, the fact that, countries have come together and have attempted to 
 
94 See Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organisation: The 
Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INT’L. L. A. 551, 577(2012). 
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articulate a different vision about how trade relations can be conducted, from The New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) to the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA), should not be easily dismissed simply because these attempts have not 
been successful. Their privileging of complementarity, solidarity and sustainability instead 
of comparative advantages and global competitiveness, for instance, may well be more 
desirable than the pursuit of competitive interests along nationalistic lines.95 The modest 
point that this article has made to conversations about alternative trading arrangements is 
that, more desirable experiments may be enabled by keeping in mind the terms of the 




95 See DONATELLA ALESSANDRINI, VALUE MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND 
REGULATION: ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES (2016).   
